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PROCEDURE 
On 17 September 1994, the Economic and Social Committee decided, in accordance 
with article 26 of its Rules of Procedure, to enable its Section for External Relations, Trade and 
Development Policy to draw up an Information Report on: 
Relations between the European Union and the United States. 
The preparatory work for this Report was carried out by the following members 
assisted by the Rapporteur's and the Group Experts whose names are given below: 
President: Mr van DUK 
Rapporteur: Mrs DAVISON 
Members: Mr ANDRADE 
Mr BAEZA 
Mr EWERT 
Mr GAUDER 
Mr GIESECKE 
Mr LIVERANI 
Mr PAPAMICHAi:L 
Mr PELLETIER R. 
Mr PEZZINI 
Mr POMPEN 
Experts: 
For the Rapporteur: Mr WOOLCOCK 
ROMOLI 
ZELLHOEFER 
O'NEILL 
For Group I Mr 
For Group II Mr 
For Group III Mrs 
The Study Group met on three occasions: 
18 January 1995 
8 March 1995 
24 May 1995. 
In connection with the work of the study group, a Committee delegation visited 
Washington from 3-6 April 1995. 
The Information Report was aaopted by the Section on 6 July 1995 by a majority vote 
and two abstentions. 
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Summary 
The US is the EU' s most important trading partner and the two-share common fundamental principles. 
The end to the Cold War signals less emphasis on security cooperation and more on economic 
cooperation and the Uruguay Round created a framework for deepening EU-US trade relations. 1he 
EU-US trade flow is more or less balanced and 95% of that trade is trouhlefree. The EU is no longer 
standing accused as "fortress Europe" and there are moves towards transatlantic free trade. With the 
US temporarily focused on domestic issues, it would be helpful for the EU to take the initiative on EU-
US relations. Where trade differences between the EU and US keep resurfacing, it is /a.rgely due to 
different traditions in regulatory policy and to the different perspectives of the various interest groups 
on either side of the Atlantic. Transatlantic cooperation between economic and social interest groups, 
extending from the business dialogue which is currently being promoted, would have the benefit of 
deepening a dialogue which to date has been /a.rgely carried out by a relatively small group of experts 
in the political and security community. Progress could be envisaged particu/a.rly on the essentially 
technical subjects of regulatory policy, including :;tandards and the important area of environmental 
protection. 
Overcoming remammg difficulties between the US and the EU is also important for the full 
involvement of Japan in world trade and for a combined effort to help developing countries. The close 
interaction between economic and security concerns also means a growing role for transatlantic 
cooperation on conflict prevention. 
* 
* * 
1. Introduction 
1. 1. For nearly fifty years the transatlantic relationship hetween the United States and 
Western Eurnpe was hased on a common security interest. There were shared common fundamental 
principles, historic. cultural links and growing economic interdependence. But the foundations of the 
relationship were in a commnn security interest. The end of the Cold War has brought a shift in the 
focus of the "transatlantic dialogue". When security concerns predominated the dialogue was led by 
the l 1S and European speciali:-.ts in security. The end of the Cnld War has meant a greater awareness 
of the importance uf commercial. envirnnmental and social issues and created an opportunity for a 
positive EU contribution. Security issues are still of major importance. indeed. close cooperation 
hetween the United States and the European Union will he essential if the new security threats 
stemming from political and economic instability and ethnic tensions are to he addressed. But if the 
transatlantic dialogue is to he sustained in the new circumstances prevailing after the cold war, it has 
to he broadened to encompass new constituencies concerned with commercial, social and 
environmental issues and the systems developed to cope with this representation. As the EU forum 
for consultation among representatives of business, trade unions. social, environmental, consumer and 
other interests. the Economic and Social Committee therefore feels it is timely to address the question 
of the future of EU-US relations. 
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1.2. In a more diverse and complex "dialogue" strong economic and social interest groups, 
operating within our increasingly pluralistic societies, will campaign hard on single issues. This may, 
as in the 1993 debates on trade policy, put pressure on EU-US relations unless those interests 
cooperate to recognize their common concerns and the benefits of an open approach to the rest of the 
world. 
2. Political Framework 
2.1. Political Developments in the USA 
2.1. l. During the Cold War, the US's role was to provide the security guarantee for Europe 
and other regions of the "West". In the economic sphere its leadership role had declined. But the US 
is still the world's most powerful country, and a major economic power with an increasing tendency 
to use that muscle to defend its own national interests even at the expense of multilateralism, such as 
evidenced by the growth in the use of "unilateral" trade actions. But the end of Cold War forced the 
US to redefine its role in the world in a more dramatic fashion than before. The US is still to decide 
on its new role. To a large extent its role will be shaped by developments, not least the policies of 
the US 's major partners including the EU as well as by changing domestic politics. 
2.1.2. The incoming President Clinton shifted the focus onto a renewal of America and on 
the domestic economy. This focus on renewal found expression in efforts to strengthen US 
competitiveness, through federal support for research and development and an aggressive export 
strategy. Engagement in other parts of the world was run down (Somalia) or resisted (Bosnia). The 
era of President Bush saw greater commitment to the UN: attitudes have since changed, although US 
support for European integration remains. The Clinton administration embraced the concept of a 
European defence identity and a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is a growing 
population from Latin America and the Pacific. Family and culturai ties with Europe remain strong. 
The President has shown his interest in European affairs by appointing some of the most prominent 
analysts of Europe to the highest levels of government. But there has been little contact between 
officials responsible for handling NA TO and EU affairs. The administration has championed an 
enlargement of NATO to include central and eastern European countries and sought a pragmatic 
partnership with Russia. A broad consensus in the US insisted, however, that domestic renewal was 
a precondition for a responsible foreign policy. 
2.1.3. Despite its emphasis on the domestic economy the Clinton administration supported 
the conclusion of the multilateral Uruguay Round trade negotiations. But it also completed the 
ratification of the NAFT A agreement (in December 1993) and supported the target of a free trade area 
within the APEC, (Asia Pacific Economic Community), area by 2020 (in September 1994) and 
initiated a Free Trade for the Americas Agreement (in December 1994). 
2.1.4. Recent changes following the US mid-term election of 1994, raise new doubts about 
how the US will define its role in the world. The new Republicans, like the President, were also 
elected on a largely domestic programme. Some influential members of the new Congress are seeking 
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to reduce US foreign cnmmitments, and to reduce US support for multilateral agencies and aid 
efforts. Other, arL· Ill'\\' t11 111tL·rnat1()nal issues, hut the ne\\ ~peaker tif the House, Newt Gingrich, 
supported hoth NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. The recent economic problems in Mexico may 
jeopardize the expansion of NAFTA. It is now also unclear whether the Clinton administration's 
agenda for post Uruguay Round trade negotiations, which included environment and social issues, will 
survive the change in Congress. Congress will have the opportunity to set up priorities and include 
or exclude some elements. For example it is now a matter of considerable debate whether Congress 
will grant fast track negotiating authority for negotiations with Latin America on the Free Trade for 
the Americas and Chile on NAFTA if they include environmental and social clauses. 
2.1.5. In the wake of a new US resistance to expenditure abroad, this regionalism or 
unilateralism in trade also reflects an effort to concentrate US areas of political action on regions 
where there is a clear national interest. 
2.1.6. The constituency which feels that during the Cold War, problems at home were 
neglected is predominating at the moment whilst importers and exporters are failing to get across the 
benefits of an open attitude. US domestic policy reflects budgetary and job creation concerns. The 
US faces structural problems with relatively low productivity increases over the past twenty years 
(around I% annually in cnntrast to over 2 % in Germany and 2.5% in Japan), growing budget and 
trade deficits and 10-15 % of the population in poverty. Cuts to the defence, health, housing and 
overseas aid budgets are to he accompanied by tax cuts. Growth in the US stands at 2.5%, 
unemployment at 5 .4 % . Income and employment levels are slowing down; probably consumption will 
follow suit. A "soft landing" for the economy is expected but possihly with only a pause before more 
buoyant growth. 
Economic and Social Interest Groups 
Business 
2. 1. 7. The two major representative bodies of US industry are the US Chamber of 
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. Both are represented on the US Business 
Round Table - the umbrella organization. The joint Council for EU and US business was wound up 
due to a lack of problems to put on the agenda. Instead a group of US and EU businesspeople have 
twice yearly bilateral meetings on agriculture. The National Association of US Manufacturers met 
with EU and Japanese industry representatives in March and hopes to establish a twice yearly pattern 
of meetings. 
2.1.8. A joint initiative by the US Commerce Department and the European Commission is 
to consult business on which transatlantic issues they would like to see developed. A questionnaire 
has been sent otf to thousands of companies on both sides of the Atlantic with a view to developing 
a Transatlantic Business Dialogue. US industry is not interested in anything too formal, rather in 
setting clear priorities and agendas. Issues on which it would like to make progress are product 
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standards, testing and certification, environmental legislation, and the EU' s external trade policy, e.g. 
bananas, cars, textiles. 
2.1.9. This is an attractive proposal. The Committee would like to be briefed regularly about 
developments, about the subjects dealt with in this context and about any problems which arise. This 
information will make it possible to coordinate attempts to secure deeper economic and social 
consistency between the EU and US and may serve as a model for other interest groups. 
Trade Unions 
2.1.10. The US trade unions are represented by AFL-CIO which has 14 million members in 
around 80 affiliated unions. Among its achievements, it numbers the 8 hour day and universal, free 
education. Historically, US labour unions were illegal, gaining legal status only in the 1930's. But 
they do have the right to propose trade measures to government. AFL-CIO is non party political, 
although it runs a committee on political education. AFL-CIO has called for a Transatlantic free trade 
agreement, since the working populations have similar wage, health and safety etc. standards. Indeed 
US trade unions feel that an improved awareness in the US of EU social standards and a convergence 
of our economies would encourage better conditions in the US. Unions on either side of the Atlantic 
are keen to compare economic models - exploring the reality of the US "job creating machine" 
compared with the EU "social market". (See 3.2.3 to 3.2.7). 
Consumer Organizations and Other Citizen Groups 
2.1.11. Consumer organizations hold an influential position in the US. The largest is the 
magazine publisher and product-testing organization, Consumers' Union (CU). CU belongs to 
Consumers' International (Cl), which is active in campaigning on the world trade scene for less 
protectionism and more safeguards for the poorest. CU is supported in its trade work by the small 
but focused Consumers for World Trade organizati0n. On the other side of the fence is Ralph Nader 
and his consumer organization, which leans towards the trade unions and is critical of environmental 
dumping, for example. 
2. l'.12. The current priorities of CU and of CI on trade are to encourage a more open and 
responsive WTO, to promote consumer-friendly behaviour by transnational corporations, to encourage 
international competition rules and to moderate the impact of the Intellectual Property Agreement on 
pharmaceuticals and biodiversity. Consumer organizations in the EU also belong to CI and share 
broad policy aims, but lack significant funding for intensive transatlantic cooperation. They would 
welcome any opportunity to deepen their discussions and to meet face-to-face. 
2 .1.13. Besides the consumer movement, there is an array of other citizens groups, charities 
and "social" businesses on both sides of the Atlantic which would benefit from greater exchange of 
information. For example, interaction of citizen groups with business has taken different forms. A 
significant route in the US has been through the promotion of social investment funds. It is estimated 
that stockholdings of over US$ 600 billion in the possession of state and city authorities, pension 
... I ... 
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funJs. mutual funds and churchL', ,11,: screened for ~()cial resrnnsi\'eness, such as equal orpmtunities 
and environmenral prntection. hy s11cial investment funds. The Jabour movement too, has involved 
itself in standard setting for pension funds. The result has been significant policy change in some 
majnr corporations, for example, one of the world's largest retailers decided not to buy from factories 
using child labour. EU NGOs, on the other hand, have used labelling schemes to encourage 
consumers to select products that have been socially or environmentally screened. 
Farmers' Organizations 
2.1.14. The European farmers meet regularly through COPA with the US Chamber of 
Commerce, which includes the Farm Bureau. There is a split over trade issues between the two main 
US farming organizations. The larger, more powerful Farm Bureau, which represents the bigger 
farms - about three million farmers in all, spread over most constituencies - as well as agri-business 
supported the GA TT settlement, but now insists on full use of export refunds to compete with the EU. 
The National Farmers' Union opposed the GA TT settlement and favours support for family farms. 
It has a membership of 291.000 families, offices in 19 states and is engaged in education, cooperation 
and legislation. Farmers have objected to the recent US cut in food aid commitments. (The EU and 
US were committed during the GA TT Round to providing food and other forms of aid to ease the 
transition for pnor net-food impmters). 
The producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) to agriculture is higher in the EU than in the 
US. It is. however. higher per farm in the US than in the EU. 
2.2. Political Developments in the EU 
2 .2. I. Europe is also seeking to define its role in the world. With Maastricht only a year old, 
the EU is still developing its ability to speak with one voice in foreign and security policy. For 
example. lack of agreement within the EU as well as with the US is holding up progress on the 
Inhumane Weapons Conference due in September 1995. The demand for "Europe to do more" both 
for its own security and for global security has increased and easily exceeded the capabilities of the 
intergovernmental pi liar of Common Foreign and Security Policy bui It in Maastricht. In 1991 efforts 
to create a CFSP and European Defence Identity (EDI) were seen hy the US and some in Europe as 
a possible threat to the established structures of transatlantic cooperation. Today, it is arguably the 
absence of a strong European voice which is undermining the American willingness to expand the 
transatlantic relationship although it should he borne in mind that the US government is sometimes 
held hack too by the competence of the individual States in areas such as labour rights and the 
environment. 
2.2.2. The need for cohesion in external policy of the EU applies equally to the area of 
commercial po! icy. During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations as well as in other 
commercial relations the EU sometimes struggled to maintain a coherent position. Notwithstanding 
the European Court of Justice ruling of November 1994 on EC competence in commercial policy, 
there remains uncertainty about some areas of commercial policy. For the EU to be an effective actor 
CES 978/95 vh ... / ... 
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in transatlantic relations, it must maintain credibility rn the core area ol commercial policy. The 
challenges facing the EU are therefore not only in developing a common foreign and security policy 
but in maintaining a coherent common commercial policy and in ensuring that commercial policy 
supports wider foreign/security policy objectives. 
2.2.3. Within Europe the end of the Cold War has resulted in an increase in the importance 
of commercial relations for security and foreign policy. For example, strengthening economic 
relations with the neighbouring countries in central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean is an 
important way to help promote economic and political stability in these countries. But the same 
developments have taken place at a global level. In the multipolar world that is evolving post Cold 
War, neither the United States, nor Europe, nor any other single power can hope to deal, successfully 
with the challenge by itself. 
2.3. Political cooperation 
2.3.1. By the 1970s the EU was confident enough to develop an external dimension to its 
cooperation. At first, the EU was keen to demonstrate its independence from the US and the US was 
somewhat wary. But the new challenges posed by the end of the Cold War required effective political 
cooperation between the US and EU. This need was reflected in the Transatlantic declaration, adopted 
in 1990. It sets out a framework for consultation which has developed as follows: 
Normally, the President of the US, the President of the Council of Ministers and the 
President of the Commission meet biannually. The Foreign Minis:ers meet biannually, and twice a 
year there are sub-cabinet meetings. There is also an average of 30 meetings a year between deputy 
or assistant Secretaries of State and the EU Troika. These can now be supplemented by video-
teleconferencing. 
2.3.2. The existence of such machinery does not, of course, guarantee effective coordination 
and during the first period of the Clinton administration contacts were routine without always resulting 
in much genuine cooperation. In an effort to reinvigorate the EU-US dialogue the Berlin Heads of 
State level meeting agreed to the establishment of three ad hoe senior level working groups, chaired 
by Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent, so there is now continuity between biannual summits. 
There is some feeling in the US that these groups are still bedevilled by the problem 
of a disunified EU approach. The working groups cover: 
Central and Eastern Europe - how jointly EU and US can improve their economies, market 
access, integration into the OECD and WTO. This is the first joint enterprise reaching out 
to Central and Eastern Europe and includes cooperation over aid and on environmental 
problems, e.g. nuclear power stations; 
r,cc n·H11n:: .. i.. 
2.3.3. 
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~arcntics - 11perational CO()peration. Data-intelligence sharing. dealing with international 
L'.irtv!, L''i'L'L·1:illy. 1 hL'J'L'. thL' l S \rnuld likL· t11 hi: ablt: t11 Lk:tl \\ 1th Ji lint representatives llf all 
the fifteen national police forces); and 
Common Foreign and Security Policy - discussions on human rights, conflict prevention and 
on the problems of Africa come under this working group. 
From the US side, the frustration with the lack of a united European voice on these 
issues raises questions as to whether bilateral negotiation would he more fruitful. There may therefore 
he suggestion to change the areas of work covered. Cooperation to reduce pollution and protect the 
environment is an area which might develop. There are annual technical consultations between the 
US and DG XI covering for example, air quality, hazardous waste and climate change. 
2.3.4. The question of a Transatlantic Treaty to deal with international policy and security 
issues is under debate. The US is awaiting the outcome of the inter-governmental conference before 
taking this idea up. The US would certainly welcome a process of parallel consultation alongside the 
EU's intergnvernmental conference. The June Summit of the three presidents charged a small group 
of high level representatives to examine how to reinforce EU-US relations and to report to the next 
summit in Madrid. 
2.3.5. If the US and the EU share a responsibility for cooperation and leadership in the 
world. they also share the responsibility not to dominate. There is a need to negotiate with other 
countries in a genuine effort to understand their culture; also to take account of the problems of 
poorer states which often lack the resources to represent their own needs on the world stage. The US 
and EU should aim to promote multilateralism wherever possible, and to involve Japan and the new 
emerging economic powers in this process. Japan is currently trying to find its international role and 
will need help in dning so. 
2.4. Security 
2.4. I. Security issues are discussed within the working groups set up at the Berlin Summit. 
Following the end of the Cold War. the potential consequences of possible future conflicts are less 
all-encompassing than any direct East-West confrontation. hut there have been smaller. more complex 
conflicts causing cnncern. Armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, 
amnng others. have required changes in security pnlicies and concepts. as well as rapid adjustment 
to events on the ground. The process of adaptation has begun among specialists in security policy. 
as evidenced by the NATO Summit in January I 994 which made progress towards establishing a 
common approach to the post-Cold War security order in Europe and appeared to set-aside some EU-
US differences. There have also been a number of national attempts to reformulate defence priorities, 
hut the process is far from comprehensive or complete. 
2.4.2. The current US administration regards the US as an essential element of the balance 
in Europe so believes that it must he engaged. Its priorities are to strengthen and extend NATO, to 
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support European union, to enc()urage the upgralling anll strengthen111g \lt the OSCE, (Organization 
for cooperation and security in Europe), and to develop its new relationship with Russia. 
2.4.3. A new element in security is the recognition of its broader definition to include the 
economic field. Because the EU has become a major world player in economics, it is also a serious 
contributor to world security strategy. Examples of economic policies which contribute to stability 
are the ACP agreement, the Russia agreements, the Europe agreements, the European energy charter 
and aid to the Middle East and the newly independent states of the Soviet Union. 
2.4.4. One area in which the EU and US will have to provide joint leadership within the 
framework of the UN, because of the close interaction between economic and security concerns, is 
conflict prevention. The Committee takes an interest in the area of conflict prevention through its 
efforts to bring together interest groups across ethnic divides in areas of potential conflict such as the 
Mediterranean and the ACP and by encouraging the growth of civil society in such regions. A current 
US bill aims to cut the US contribution to the UN peacekeeping effort; though it may be vetoed by 
the President. A reduced US commitment to peacekeeping is a matter for concern, but money could 
be saved by earlier action. A willingness to allocate resources to conflict prevention and to effective 
early warning systems of potential flash points would save the international community money as well 
as saving lives. 
2.4.5. For example, a more common interpretation of the broad criteria for arms exports 
which were agreed by the permanent members of the Security Council, in the European Union and 
by the members of the OSCE may promote responsibility and restraint in arms transfers. 
2.5. Overseas Aid 
2.5.1. For over two decades, official concessional aid has stagnated at a level less than half 
the target of O. 7 percent of the GNP. 
Very few EU countries have reached the target and, for the United States, the 
percentage amounts to hardly a quarter of this target of which more than half goes to two countries, 
Egypt and Israel. One problem, perhaps, is the lack of development education to sustain public 
support for overseas aid. Furthermore, there are threats from the new Congress to subsume the 
Agency for International Development under the State Department and to reduce overseas aid, 
especially to Africa. The Committee has frequently expressed its concern about the increasing poverty 
in, and isolation of, Africa. It is alarmed by this Congress proposal and indeed believes that the extent 
of poverty in developing countries and its destabilizing effect is sufficiently pressing that the EU, 
Japan and the US should discuss cooperation on a major new aid programme. 
2.6. The Environment 
The Committee has commented before on the need for the industrialized countries to 
be the first to take action, because of their responsibility for much of global pollution and because 
CES 978/95 vh 
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they have tht: n·~1)LJlTl'~ t,l :1ct 1 bch individual in tht: indthtri:11 wnrld consumes 15 tinws as much 
nf the w1H·IJ's rc")urcc~ ,h ,lnc in the develllping \\11rld. Yet at the most recent EU-US Summit, 
there was no mention of cooperation on environmental issues and progress at the Berlin conference 
on the climate change convention was disappointing. Progress at UNCED was also disappointing. The 
United States has a vigorous environmental movement. The EU and US should cooperate as a matter 
of urgency. 
2. 7. Educational and Other Exchanges 
2.7.1. The European Union's Visitors' Programme (EUVP) arranges for 24 opinion-leaders 
from throughout the US to visit the EU annually. They come from trade unions, academia, the media 
and occasionally, voluntary organizations. There are also bilateral exchanges. Similarly, the US 
Information Agency (USIA) sponsors young leaders form government and other non-profit sectors 
to visit the US, both from the EU and bilaterally. NATO has exchange programmes for academics. 
2.7.2. Further, vast numbers of universities send thousands of students both ways across the 
Atlantic by arrangements between individual universities. An example of bilateral exchange is that 
between the US and French military schools: also student exchanges between leadership training 
institutions in the US and France (especially the Ecole Nationale d'Administration). 
2.7.3. Exchanges are frequent therefore hut not a~; systematic as they might he; there is no 
central clearing house to put visitors in touch with appropriate sponsors and vice versa. Particular 
gaps felt are exchange programmes for faculty members to lecture at each others' universities and 
participate in conferences and think tanks, for which there should be non-government funding, and 
exchanges for voluntary organizations. 
2.7.4. The Commission has a mandate to negotiate a cooperation agreement with Canada and 
the US on higher education and vocational training. This would involve more intensive interaction 
between EU, US and Canadian higher education establishments, training organizations and business 
interests. Support has been given to 23 cooperation projects. bringing together some 200 higher 
education establishments on. for example, the environment and microbiology and international 
marketing for small and medium-sized businesses. The focus is on student and staff mobility, common 
study programmes and cour~e unit transfer schemes. 
3. The Centrality of Economic Relations 
The end of the cold war has increased the importance of commercial relations 
compared with military power. for example. through the promotion of economic and thus political 
stability. Trade, economic and environmental agreements whether multilateral (worldwide), as in the 
WTO (World Trade Organization set up hy the latest GATT round) and UNCED (United Nations 
Sec Committee·s Opinion on the proposal for a resolution of the Council of the European Communities on a Community 
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development (Rapporteur Mr. BOISSEREE) 
Official Journal C 287 of 4 April 1992. 
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,.~onference nn Environment and Development). llf regiu1nl. JS 111 NAFL\. ,,r the FTAA (Free Trade 
Agreement for the Americas) now play a greater role in international relations. 
3. l . Transatlantic Economic Relations 
3.1.1. Recent instability in exchange rates, brought about by the decline in the value of the 
dollar, have reawaken European concern about apparant US disinterest in the impact of exchange rate 
changes on the rest of the world. There is a deep-seated preference for stable exchange rates in 
Europe born out of many years exposure to currency fluctuations. Given the size of the US economy 
in relation to the world economy and the extent of its trade within NAFT A, the US has been less 
affected and has taken a more nonchalant attitude to international exchange rate stability. 
3.1.2. The tradition of saving is higher in the EU than in the US. Lack of savings contril:,utes 
to the constant inflow of capital into the US seen in recent years and lower confidence in the dollar. 
The dollar may in fact be losing its position as the single dominant currency with the D-mark (and 
then eventually the single European currency; and the yen playing more important roles. 
3.1.3. One efficient way to counteract the fall in the dollar would be to increase interest 
rates, but this will not be done for international purposes only for domestic ones. Then: is limited 
concern in the US that the low value of the dollar may trigger inflation by raising the price of 
imports. The perception is that this is outweighed by the benefits to exporters. US industry, in 
particular, is happy with the low dollar value and with the government policy of benign neglect. 
Meanwhile EU exporters are losing out to US competitors. 
3.1.4. This problem underlines the lack of international cooperation on macroeconomic and 
monetary issues. Industry on both sides of the Atlantic agree that instability and swings in currency 
values on the world market are unhelpful. EU policy puts the battle against inflation and stability of 
its currencies first. 
3.1.5. Beyond exchange rates transatlantic relations are reasonably sound. Improved 
economic growth in Europe has reduced divergencies in growth rates between the EU and US. But 
even here there are underlying differences, with continental Europe showing a greater price stability 
than the US, where shorter term economic growth prospects are relatively more important. 
3.1.6. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round has removed a substantial irritant in trade 
relations. There are no structural trade deficits across the Atlantic and trade balances change over time 
but broadly reflect relative growth and exchange rate changes. For example, the EU's trade deficit 
with the US fell from ECU 10.8 bn in 1992 to ECU 2.2 bn in 1993 as a result of European export 
growth to match high GDP growth in the US. This was mainly reflected in a growth in EU 
manufactured products, for which a US trade surplus with the EU of US$ 5.1 bn in 1992 was 
converted into a deficit with the EU in manufactures of US$ 2.2 bn in 1993 (Eurostat). 
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3.1.7. EU-US trade is very important. Two-way trade tn 1994 will he of the order of 
US$ 170 hilli1m. But 1t h 1111l1t: 111nt.-;1st: in foreign direct imcstmcnt acrnss the Atlantic that one sees 
the degree llf econnmic interJependence. US foreign llirect investment in Europe totals around US$ 
250 billion (some 41 % of total US FOi) and EU FOi in the US about the same amount (or more than 
50% of European FOi). (See tables 9, 10 and 11 for details). This compares with US$ 48 billion 
investment in Asia. The sales of European affiliates of US companies total US$ 800 billion per 
annum, and the sales of the US affiliates of European companies US$ 600 billion. 2.8m Europeans 
are employed in US companies and 2. 7m US citizens in EU companies. There is thus a broad balance 
of trade between the two, unlike the structural trade deficit which the US has with Japan and China. 
3.2. Differences in Approach to Domestic Market Regulation 
3.2.1. Despite this sound basis, transatlantic economic relations are repeatedly disrupted by 
disputes of varying degrees of intensity over what often appear to he issues of relatively minor 
importance to the economies as a whole, for example bovine somatotropin and hormones in beef. In 
order to understand why such disputes arise, it is necessary to understand the different approaches 
to domestic. regulatory policies and trade or commercial policies that persist between the EU and US. 
3.2.2. There are three areas of difference between the EU and US: 
the nature of the market economy in each; 
the approaches to regulation of market Jistortions; and 
how the US and EU deal with the regulation of interdependent and integrating economies. 
The nature of the market economy 
3.2.3. The first of these concerns the predominant social market, consensus-based, market 
economy in the Ell as compared to the free market, Anglo-Saxon form of market economy in the 
United States. In the former, higher social prnvisinn is seen as a means of achieving broad consensus 
among the social partners. which in turn promotes productivity and competitiveness. There is also a 
greater emphasis on institutions to ensure social cohesion anJ the fulfilment of regional and other 
structural policy objectives. The operation of the market is shapeJ hy the existence of a regulatory 
framework haseJ on a hrnad consensus within society. This funJamental difference finds expression 
in many ways including, for example. labour market regulation. In its Opinion of 20 October 1993, 
the Cnmmittee stressed that the most pressing prnhlem facing the EL Member States at present is how 
to return to a growth rate high enough to ml1p up unemployment, while also maintaining an effective 
system of social protection and solidarity which reflects the aspirations and traditions of EU citizens. 
Here the Committee was reflecting the European preference for achieving a consensus and social 
cohesion. 
3.2.4. Broadly speaking, the EU emphasis is on maintaining standards and wage levels for 
those in work and on shoring up declining industries, perhaps at the expense of creating new jobs for 
the unemployed. The US approach is the opposite. There is very little protection for workers who are 
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fireJ t,1r trying t(1 set up u111,'il\ It 111:1y take yc:u, 1 ,,r th,'. kgdl ~\qcm t,1 reinstate them Ill their Jnhs. 
Employers can also permanently replace strikers with new workers. As a result, although, according 
to an independent survey commissioned by AFL-CIO, 40% of the workforce say they would like to 
join a union, only 16% belong. The US has approximately six per cent unemployment compared with 
an average 10.9% per cent in the EU. Since President Clinton took office 6.3 million jobs have been 
created. However, 20% of these have been low paid jobs in discount shopping stores while well-paid 
blue collar jobs in tyres, steel and cars have failed to return to 1990 pre recession levels. In recent 
years, the gap between blue collar and white collar workers has widened and with the exception of 
some such as auto workers, blue collar real wages have decreased. 
3.2.5. Unemployment benefits depend upon the laws of the different Federal States. On 
average about 30% of the unemployed are covered. The remainder rely on welfare and food stamps. 
There is no state health insurance system. Only the very poor and retired people receive free medical 
care. Perhaps 15-20 % of people draw the minimum wage with I 0-15 % of the population below the 
poverty level. 
3.2.6. In the US. social provision is often seen first and foremost as a cost, which reduces 
competitiveness and thus the ability to pay for social provision. There is no broad political consensus 
on the regulatory framework within which markets are to operate. As a result there is a tendency for 
changes and arguably a tendency for regulatory competition and legal actions to shape the legal 
framework rather than for political preferences to do so. In this area there is, in effect, competition 
between the more laissez-faire Anglo-American form of market economy and the continental European 
model, across the Atlantic as well as within the EU. 
3.2.7. A perhaps otherwise harsh environment is tempered by the USA's tradition of 
voluntary help. However, the very many voluntary organizations tend to lack mass membership or 
resources. They may on occasion, for example, rely on union help. 
Regulation of market failure 
3.2.8. The United States has been developing regulatory policies within the federation of 
states for nearly 200 years. This was based on limited regulatory intervention in cases of market 
failure. Within Europe, regulation of market failure was carried out at the national level until the 
1980s when establishment of a genuine single European market following the earlier development of 
the common market necessitated the removal of national regulatory barriers. The national approach 
within Europe used, more often than in the United States, to be to take the sector concerned into 
public ownership (i.e. utilities). This resulted in regulatory policies under more political control than 
the independent regulatory agencies that developed in the United States under the control of the 
Federal and State Courts. The 1980s has see11 a shift in Europe towards more regulatory agencies, 
but there is still reluctance to accept the establishment of agencies without direct political control, 
especially at the European level. As a result more areas of regulatory policy are subject to political 
discretionary control in Europe than in the US. Moves to create a single market in Europe have 
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reduced tlw di,LTL't11111 111 the lu11tls 11111:iti1mal re~uLl!11r, :iuth,,rities. su that there has been some 
rnnvergence hl't\, cen the l '::, dnd Eurnpean practice. 
Regulation of interdependent and integrating markets 
3.2.9. Although the US may have a long history and experience in the regulation of market 
failure, it is the EU which has developed the most advanced techniques and methods for dealing with 
regulation in integrating markets. The EU approach is based on policy approximation, mutual 
recognition and home state regulatory jurisdiction. The United States approach continues to be shaped 
by traditional "trade" policies and thus national treatment and host state control. These respective 
approaches are being retlected in the regional approaches of the EU and the US . 
3.3. US and EU external commercial policies compared 
There are also differences in EU and US approaches to commercial policy which 
result from the structures of decision-making concerning commercial policy and historical 
developments. 
The United States 
3. 3. I. The US has proved much more proactive than the EU in commercial diplomacy. In 
the last decade the US has pushed for a new round of the GA TT (the Uruguay Round), but US 
support for multilateral approaches to trade and investment issues has become progressively more 
qualified since the early 1970s. Support for multilateral negotiations has been accompanied by a 
strengthening of domestic trade remedies with which to address what the US perceives as "unfair" 
trade practices and policies not adequately addressed by multilateral negotiations. These trade 
remedies have taken the form of enhanced countervailing and anti-dumping provisions as well as the 
"unilateral" instrument Section 30 I. The qua I ified support for multilateral solutions was also reflected 
in the US position during the Uruguay Round on the :.irea of dispute settlement and the establishment 
of the WTO and cases such as services. The issue of Sllvereignty sets clear limits to how far the US 
can m is willing to go towards multilateral agreements which touch upon constitutional powers 
granted to Congress in C1)111mercial policy and to the indi,·idual states in areas of regulatory and 
investment policy. 
3.3.2. Whilst the LS has been able to initiate multilateral negotiations, it has become 
progressively less able tn determine the shape of the multilateral rules as other players, notably the 
EU, have gained in relative economic weight. At least in partial response to this loss of influence at 
the multilateral level the US has also initiated or supported regional agreements with Canada (US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989), Mexico (North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994). 
More recently the US has become more active in regional strategies and initiated negotiations with 
the rest of the western hemisphere which the aim of estahlishing a Free Trade for the Americas 
Agreement (FT AA) (in December 1994) and has supported the calls for a similar free trade 
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arran~r:rncnt W\t:rin!:-' the P,H.:i1ic Rim Cl1untrics 111 .\PEC 1111 Sq,1l·mhcr 1994). These Je\'t'lupments 
suggest that regional agreements may be one of the US priorities uver the coming years. 
3.3.3. In addition to the multilateral and regional pillars of US policy there is also a 
plurilateral pillar. This takes the form of qualified mfn (most favoured nation agreements), such as 
the Government Purchasing Agreement in the GA TI or agreements of "like-minded countries" such 
as the current effort to establish a binding investment instrument in the OECD. 
3.3.4. Finally and worryingly, the US has become progressively more active in unilateral 
policy as the feeling that the multilateral system only serves others and not the United States' interests 
has grown. The EU should seek to bring the US back fully to the multilateral approach. The active 
use of "unfair" trade provisions designed to provide remedies for US interests affected by what are 
perceived to be the unfair practices of other countries has assumed greater importance. The~~ take 
the form of Section 301 (introduced in the 1973 Trade Act), Super 301 (introduced in 1988 and since 
1994 based on an executive order) and Special 301 for instances in which the US believe its trading 
partners are not protecting US intellectual property rights sufficiently. Nor are anti-dumping actions 
in any way limited to the protection from predatory pricing envisaged under the WTO. In short the 
United States uses one of three pillars, or a combination of multilateral, plurilateral, regional and 
unilateral instruments, depending on which can best achieve US objectives. 
The European Union 
3.3.5. In contrast to this activism on the part of the US, the EU has tended to be more 
reactive. It followed the US (and Japan) into the Uruguay Round with an agenda largely set by US 
proactive pressure. Once in the Round, the EU supported the process of negotiations and continuously 
pressed for genuine multilateral solutions (when the US sometimes appeared ready to accept 
plurilateral deals). As the US has moved to question the benefits of a "rules-based" multilateral 
system, the EU has come more and more to accept such a system, as is illustrated in the EU support 
for the WTO and revised dispute settlement provisions agreed in the Uruguay Round. 
3.3.6. At a regional level the EU has had, if anything a greater impact, than the US. The 
European acquis is being put forward as an aim for neighbouring countries seeking guaranteed access 
to the large single European market. The EU is also now developing policies which appear to be 
aimed at establishing links with other regional entities. New or proposed preferential trading 
arrangements now cover, EU-CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), EU-Mediterranean, EU-ACP, EU-
CIS, EU-Mexico and EU-Mercosur. 
3.3.7. Unlike the US, the EU has not made extensive use of unilateral action. The main 
reason for this is a welcome commitment to multilateralism, as well as the absence of any consensus, 
among the Member State governments, on the advisability of deploying the "big stick" of unilateral 
leverage. The New Commercial Instrument has only been used in a few minor cases. A revised NCI 
may change this but the Commission's proposals will only open up the scope for industry petitions 
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under the \'(']. Tlw instrument still clearly cnmes under multilateral discipline of the WTO. As the 
United State,. J,,,.,, ,, . ,l1L· I I L·,111. ,1nd d11cs. use trc1Lk i11c.:tru111cnr, -;ul.'h ,i., ;mti-durnping measures. 
3.3.8. The only suhstantial trading powers with whom the EU or the US are not now 
discussing the possihility of a special trading arrangement are each other (See para 8.1.8.6). The 
question here is whether the future lies in toning down these regional agreements, multilateralizing 
them, or dividing the glohe into competing blocs, from which the economically weak, such as many 
African nations. may be excluded. As the two major trading powers, the US and EU share the 
responsihility to take proper account of the politically and economically weaker nations. The 
disadvantages to those countries excluded from regional agreements are moderated only slightly by 
GA TT rules. The WTO has slightly strengthened the right to challenge preferential trade agreements 
which Jo 1rnt progress into free trade areas within ten years or which do not include substantially "all 
trade". hut not sufficiently to check their growth or any negative impact on third countries. The 
potential exists. therefore for the evolution 01 completing regional approaches to dealing with 
increased econnmic interdependence. The EU and US need therefore to make efforts to multilateralize 
their regional efforts (lr Clll11e t!l some accommodation with each other. 
4. Bilateral Issues 
The ,·ast maj1lr1ty 11f trade relatinns hetween the EU and the US are trouhle-free but 
there are S\1me bilateral irritants. many of them characterized hy the different approach to regulation 
as JescriheJ ahove. 
4.1. EU Enlargement 
Overall the accession nf Austria. Sweden and Finland has significantly reduced import 
tariffs for the US. notwithstanding increases in some areas such as chemicals and computer parts. 
Finnish tariffs nn scmi-C\l!lductors haYe gone up 14% for example. For this the US is entitled to 
compensati(1n hy GATT. Disputes ()\'er the s.:ale of compensation featured in EU-US relations after 
the last enlargement (it the El'. In the current enlargement an interim agreement has heen reached 
which has defused S\lme nf the tensi\ln. hut there remain snme douhts ahout the final level nf 
"compensatinn". with the El emphasizing the gains made by the l 1S in other sectors. 
The l'S is als1l c11nccrned that the EU should nnt extend harriers as it integrates more 
closely with Central and Lt:..tern ELm1pe . .\!ready there 1s some inclinati\1n in the CEE tn give 
preference t(l the EU. 
4.2. Audio-visual 
This is perhaps the clearest example of differing EU-US perceptions of the need for 
regulation. In this sector srnne Member States support the regulatinn of hroadcasting in order to 
maintain a national/European cultural identity. to monitor the quality of material shown on European 
television and to support the national/European film industry. In the US, a free market in television 
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15 eLJUatcJ \\ ilil !ree :,pen:h and thus any re~ll 1Lt11111 c1~ u11Je1rn111111g JL·n,ucracy. The l 1S has therefore 
objected to the EU requirement for the majority of entertainment broadcast in the EU to he of EU 
origin "where practicable". Tensions are building up on this issue which both sides see as fundamental 
although the US industry would be alarmed if it came to sanctions. It is perhaps more concerned at 
the threat that the cultural argument, which it does not fully recognize, will be applied by the EU to 
new technologies. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers the audio-visual 
sector, but the EU sought an exemption from commitments to offer national treatment which 
effectively excludes the sector from the provisions of the GA TS. Bilateral tensions on this issue are 
therefore unlikely to be resolved through GA TS intermediation. A transatlantic dialogue on this, with 
clearer EU definition of the boundaries of its cultural argument could help. 
4.3. Food Standards - Bovine Somatotropin (BST) and Hormones in Beef 
4.3.1. There are two trade differences over food standards of which hormones in beef is 
likely to cause earlier tension. The EU extended moratorium on BST will probably also be challenged 
by the US. The Uruguay Round agreement says that food standards cannot be challenged as trade 
barriers, as long as there is scientific backir.g for them. However in both cases there is imperfect 
scientific evidence; and the agreement makes no provision for dealing with uncertainties. If scientific 
opinion is divided, however, the agreement provides for preventive measures. The US position at 
home is that it will maintain the highest possible food standards and allow the benefit of the doubt 
where scientific evidence is uncertain. At the same time it is pushing the EU to accept imports of beef 
produced with hormones and has rejected the call of the EU and certain US beef producers for 
cer•ification of beef produced without hormones. 
4.3.2. Consumer information on food standards should be provided on both sides of the 
Atlantic, but labelling would not work for BST since methods for detecting residues have not been 
developed yet and milk is pooled which would make identification for labelling very difficult. The 
Committee supported the EU moratorium in its Opinion on the use of Bovine Somatotropin in the 
European Union (CES 1023/94 September 1994) partly on the grounds that BST is not needed and 
in view of consumer opposition. Neither of these reasons would be valid under the new GA TT. 
However, the Committee's other objections; animal welfare and effect on consumers of likely 
increased antibiotic use give the EU a good case. The fact that a limited number of countries with 
production deficits have authorized the use of the hormone should not mean that health regulations 
can he relaxed at international level. Freer trade need not mean lower standards. 
4.4. Product Standards 
4.4.1. The issues being discussed are those of transparency of product standards, mutual 
recognition and, going further, mutual certification. This would enable manufacturers to test just 
once, in each others' markets. An example of the problems to be overcome is that the US Food and 
Drugs Administration does not certify. There are many different certifying agencies which the US 
would need to clarify for exporters. EU environmental standards for example are not completely 
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c,lherent L'ither lhL· \nh: 1 1, ,;: '·11,1rnh:1· ,ii C.1m11~,·:cs.: ,1,'.', 1,c, ih mcmhers t1l aJhere t,1 the German 
regulations as these :ire gL·ncraliy the ughtest. 
4.4.2. The first step to complete is the mutual recogmtion agreement which should be 
adopted within the two year deadline. US manufacturers would like it extended to cover 
telecommunications and pharmaceuticals. It is not always clear to third country manufacturers how 
to obtain marks like the CE mark. Standards cooperation on the environment would be useful both 
to reinforce enviromental protection and to forge regulatory cooperation. There needs to be more 
cooperation on eco-Iabelling, packaging and recycling and to ensure that environmental standards 
generally are not biased to the domestic market. 
4.5. Agriculture 
4.5.1. Budgetary constraints mean that the US is likely to cut subsidies to its agriculture. For 
example, current proposals would eliminate the sugar and peanut price support programmes. The long 
term US aim for agricultural trade remains. in themy. the elimination of export subsidies. There 
could, therefore, he growing pressun.: froin the L'S for the EU to do more to reduce export and other 
subsidies to agriculture. This cou Id result it the US does reduce its national subsidy programmes. 
Under the Uruguay Rnund Agreement. there is a commitment to reduce agricultural support and 
protection further in the resumed multilateral trade negotiations due to begin in 1999. From a US 
point a view, Community producti1m and exports which receive some form of government assistance 
are the major source of concern and are at the core of many of the bilateral trade disputes. This may 
be eased by further reform of the CAP in preparation for the accession of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Given the GATT commitments. the agricultural sectors from these countries could not be 
accommodated within an enlarged EU without first modifying the farm support arrangements. 
4. 5. 2. There have been improvements in transatlantic relations over agriculture since the 
GATT Round was concluded. The possibility n11w exists. within the framework of WTO rules to 
prevent unfair competition. that both US and El; farming could become genuinely competitive. 
Pressure to move this way is likely to cnme trnm EL nlln-agricultural industries, which currently lose 
resources to agriculture anJ which want access tn the CEE market. as well as from the more efficient 
farmers. allll\ved in Slll1le stctPrs since the \tacSharry reforms of the CAP to compete mnre on price 
for the right to expand. 
4.5.3. If the EL and l:S did manage t,1 agree to mnre open markets in the agricultural and 
other sectors, - this would pave the way for freer trade acrnss the hoard. Whilst the potential gains 
to the EU economy would he great. there would he concomitant disadvantages for certain sectors in 
the EU and the US. 
4.6. Aircraft 
The EU and US came to an agreement in 1993 on subsidies for aircraft 
manufacturers. This set limits on suhsidies with which airhus could cope. However, the US is raising 
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the issue r1~ain as it is tile ~ubject \lt strnng lohbymg by the LS av1atll1n industry. For its part. the EU 
has reservations about indirect subsidies to the US industry. 
4. 7. Telecommunications and Information Policy 
4. 7 .1. The EU and US have not yet reached agreement on the opening of the 
telecommunications procurement markets. There is also increasing US pressure on the EU to 
liberalize its network provision faster than the agreed timetable. Given the developments in the US 
with the construction of "information highways", there could be scope for trade conflicts over access 
to each others information markets. Bilateral consultations are taking place on the "information 
society" and there was a successful major conference at the end of February in Brussels to discuss 
the issue. This was agreed as the European contribution to a widening of G7 talks on future issues 
and follows the Detroit discussion on labour market regulation in March 1994. 
4.7.2. In principle there is considerable scope for gain from increased competition m 
financial services and telecommunications. Eowever, there are also risks that systems of prudential 
control and investor ;ind policy holder protection will not be up to the task of protecting consumers. 
There are also risks that increased competition could jeopardize services to some groups of consumers 
such as those living in sparsely populated areas. Careful monitoring of the agreements will be needed. 
5. Issues concerning the EU and US roles in the Multilateral System 
5.1. Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results 
5.1.1. Congress has now ratified the Uruguay Round and the Council of Ministers did so 
on 19/20 December 1994. But in both cases implementing legislation contained a number of measures 
that could create difficulties for US-EU relations and influence the results. For example, the US 
Congress has tended t() use ambiguity in the text of the Uruguay Round agreement to defend US trade 
remedies. Although the establishment of a Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement was seen as 
having more political relevance than substance, if the US is successfully challenged on its 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements the Commission could be called into action. This 
could raise the question of US commitment to the WTO. In Europe, the European Commission has 
included a strengthening of the New Commercial Instrument ( opening the way for industries to initiate 
investigations). This is modelled on the US Section 301 and could be seen as a worrying shift towards 
a more unilateral approach and away from multilateral dispute settlement. 
5.2. The operation of the World Trade Organization 
5.2.1. The WTO could also figure in the medium-term issues in EU-US relations. One of 
the major successes of the Uruguay Round was the decision to create a new body with legal status, 
the world trade organization, to oversee the conduct of trade relations between its members. It will 
administer all existing GA IT agreements, including the results of the Uruguay Round, the integrated 
dispute settlement mechanism, and the trade policy review mechanism. The organization will also 
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provide a forum for further tr:tdL· 11egt1tiatillns .\11 parties tti the GATT are elig1hle \tl hecnrne 
members. 
5.2.2. The multilateral trade organization will be administered by a general council of 
representatives of all members. The general council will also establish separate councils, to oversee 
the operations of specific agreements. There will be a ministerial conference at least once every two 
years. 
5. 2. 3. If it is sufficiently resourced to oversee increased access to information, a broadening 
of GA TT consultation procedures and wider analysis of the impact of trade measures to incorporate 
developmental, environmental and social issues, this would be a positive development. The WTO will 
not be accountable to the UN General Assembly. 
5.2.4. The new order's bias towards commerce contrasts with the broader social and 
developmental perspective that was behind the concept of the International Trade Organization (ITO) 
proposed at the UN conference on Trade and Employment in 1947. A more powerful WTO could be 
advantageous to economically weaker participants, but their interests (and those of social, consumer 
and environmental interests) require special attention. 
5.2.5. The Uruguay Round agreement has succeeded in strengthening the multilateral dispute 
settlement procedures of the WTO. For example, under ,he new procedures it is no longer possible 
for one Contracting Party to block a Panel Decision. Only unanimity of all Contracting Parties can 
block decisions of the WTO panels. If this more adjudicative approach to trade disputes works it will 
facilitate the evolution of a WTO "case law", thus enabling the WTO rules to evolve with the 
international economy and political preferences of the WTO Contracting Parties. Such a development 
would, however, mean a progressive increase in the "supranational" elements of the WTO. 
5.2.6. The EU has traditionally opposed adjudication in the resolution of trade disputes, 
arguing that commercial policy issues affect national policy preferences and cannot therefore he left 
to an unaccountable, quasi-legal system of decision making. The US has traditionally favoured more 
adjudication in order to ensure that decisions were taken. Paradoxically the positions now appear to 
have reversed, with the EU supporting multilateral adjudication (as a means of controlling the 
unilateral interpretation of multilateral rules by the US) and the US ( or at least parts nf Congress) now 
getting nervous about the potential loss of sovereignty involved. Another important factor here is the 
awareness of environmental and other interest groups that decisions taken in Geneva will have 
important implications on national policy options. For the WTO to work effectively both the US and 
the EU must support the new procedures. It is not yet clear that there is a firm commitment to the 
more adjudicative approach. 
5.2.7. If the WTO is not seen as being credible in the resolution of trade disputes there is 
a danger that the US, possibly followed by the EU, will revert to unilateral means of enforcing trade 
agreements. As this means, in effect, a unilateral interpretation of what is "fair", the multilateral 
system would be undermined and much of what was agreed during the Uruguay Round would be not 
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EU-US cooperation on the development of the WTO to ensure its effective operation. The US is also 
calling for much more transparency within the WTO. 
5.2.8. The EU has expressed concern about the focus on the bilateral and unilateral approach 
in US trade policy. One example is the attempt of the US, in the light of its serious trade deficit with 
Japan, to open up the Japanese market on the basis of quantitative targets. The US-Japan agreements 
were negotiated on the basis of most favoured national treatment, which should mean that the 
liberalization is of benefit to others. The question is whether the agenda will properly encompass other 
interests and how the EU could contribute to discussions. 
5.2.9. Another problem is the panoply of unilateral trade measures still provided for under 
Section 301, Special 301 and Super 301. This underlines the importance of the new dispute settlement 
procedures agreed in the Uruguay Round and the need to challenge implementation of 301 measures. 
Both parties need to renew their commitment to multilateralism. 
Services 
5.2.10. The general agreement on trade in services seeks en apply general GA TT rules and 
disciplines, such as non-discrimination, transparency and dispute settlement to all services with the 
exception of services supplied as part of governmental functions. The agreement contains annexes 
which take into account the different nature of various sectors. Specific commitments to liberalize 
individual sectors such as transport, financial services (for which some safeguards to protect 
consumers apply) and telecommunications are to he undertaken through bilateral negotiation which 
leaves scope for US-EU cooperation. The US has concluded a financial services agreement with Japan 
and is committed to work for the next 18 months for its incorporation under the WTO. Serious 
negotiations under GATT are only just beginning. Offers are required hy the end of June. The EU, 
which has a fairly open policy on services ha:; put in its hid. The US nffer is still awaited. 
5.2.11. As is the case with trade in goods. general exemptions will he available for specific 
purposes such as protecting the health and safety of plants, animals and humans. and preventing 
deception and fraud. However, the agreement also allows signatories to request exemptions from the 
principle of non-discrimination for particular measures. These exemptions are then subject tn review 
after five years and a normal limit of ten years. Service industries which are nnt exempted hy their 
governments may he the subject of retaliation if foreign service companies are discriminated against. 
If services are eventually incorporated into GATT in a super trade regime, then the violating country 
could face cross retaliation actions. This means that the country offended can retaliate not only in the 
area of services but in goods as well. 
6. New Issues in Commercial Policy 
The Uruguay Round dealt with the issues of the 1980s. Issues being discussed in the 
1990s include trade and investment, trade and environment, trade and competition and trade and 
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social issues. There is a risk that the US and EU will adnpt din:rgent approaches. 11r altt:rnatively, 
will foil to takt: full acc11u11t 11( the imp:ict 1111 Jt:,t:!nping c11unrries. 
6.1. Trade and Investment 
6.1. 1. Efforts to develop a new international investment instrument will be of central 
importance in the coming months and years. The US appears at present to favour a plurilateral 
approach to investment, such as through a binding Multilateral agreement on an Investment Instrument 
in the OECD. The EU is in the process of determining its policy in this area. The issue includes 
whether a plurilateral approach in the OECD should be pursued initially, or whether a genuine 
multilateral agreement should be sought from the outset. As it is the developing economies which 
would be potentially most affected by a new investment regime, the tactics of how to negotiate are 
important. To produce an agreement in the OECD and try to impose it on the developing economies 
may not be most politic approach. On the other hand, developing economies are keen to attract 
investment and the case is made, primarily in the United States, that once an OECD instrument is 
available countries will have no option but to sign up to it. 
6.1.2. The Commission proposal on investment, not yet fully endorsed by the Council, 
requests the OECD to pursue its work aimed at elaborating a multilateral investment agreement and 
urges an early start of discussions in the WTO in order to prepare formal negotiations which should 
begin as soon as possible. 
6.2. Trade and the Environment 
6.2.1. Important negotiations on trade and the environment are taking place, in the WTO 
and OECD, with concerns being expressed about the impact of increasing trade on the environment. 
Here US and EU positions will again be important for the shape of any future agreements. To date 
the US has appeared more willing to adopt unilateral trade measures in pursuit of its own 
environmental policy objectives than the EU. For example, the US imposed standards regarding the 
drowning of dolphins while catching tuna on tuna imports, which were based on the quantity drowned 
in US catches. The US negotiated an environmental clause to the NAFTA agreement, with which the 
environmental organizations were dissatisfied as lacking muscle. Even so, its future is in doubt with 
the new Congress. 
6.2.2. The threat of green protectionism (often envisaged for use against the poorer 
countries) would be greatly reduced if the EU and US took a lead in international environmental 
agreements and in reducing their own contribution to pollution. Whilst che Committee shares the 
concerns of environmental organizations about the extent of current environmental destruction, there 
are risks in shifting the global environmental debate too firmly into the trade arena where developing 
countries are so vulnerable to protectionism. Many of the solutions to trade-related environmental 
destruction lie outside the competence of the WTO. Protectionism is not the way to enforce 
environmental ( or social) improvements on to other countries - especially developing countries. The 
use of import taxes to penalise "environmental dumping", for example, relies on each nation acting 
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as judge and jury. Funhn. d11krL·1H l'II\ 1ru11rnc11t;d ~t:llllL11lb ,ire ,,1rnct1ine, ;tl'ccptahk 111 d1tk1l'.lll 
countries and environmental import duties, for example, are likely to be counter-productive. The 
result may well he to relocate the polluting industry into the country imposing environmental 
protection and to leave the poorer exporting nation to try to undercut the protection or to sell 
elsewhere by lowering its prices and standards. 
6.2.3. Nonetheless environmental damage is of immense concern. The EU and US should 
encourage stringent international agreements and their consumers to modify their lifestyles. (This is 
an area where EU-US ngos should cooperate.) There are ways in which GATT should be made more 
supportive of environmental objectives. 
This is an area of work where the Committee might usefully contribute an opinion. 
6.3. Competition Policy 
6.3.1. Despite legal problems with the status of the 1991 bilateral anti-trust agreement. 
cooperation and regulatory coordination in this field between the competition authorities of the US 
and the EU has hegun. Information is exchanged between the competition authorities, which can help 
address the effects of anti-competitive behaviour outside the jurisdiction of either party. Issues tn 
discuss include rules against price advertising as, for example, hy professional associations, 
consolidation of producers and distributors and government procurement. 
6.3.2. The US and EU agreed to involve developing countries more in the discussions. The 
freer trade environment adds to world wealth but also reduces the influence of governments. The 
combined turnover of the two largest food companies in the world, for example, is larger than the 
gross national income of more than 170 of the world's nations. Spending on their products last year 
was equal to the gross national product of Austria, or represents 500 Belgian francs per person on 
earth. The UN and OECD codes and the recent drafting hy the Clinton Administration of Model 
Business Principles for US multinationals reflect concern tn introduce standards of behaviour for such 
powerful actors on the world stage. Tncs generate very useful income and their investment is 
welcomed by most countries hut their economic power means that when ahuses do take place. the 
consequences can be serious. Competing tncs may form strategic alliances and export cartels. for 
example. 
6.3.3. Governments increasingly lack the knowledge and power to control the activities of 
transnational corporations. The development of international competition policy is one important way 
to tackle abuses. The EU has developed a useful system via Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. The US 
applies its competition rules extra-territorially and the Justice Department has just published new 
guidelines which suggest a further toughening of the US approach and a greater use of extra-territorial 
powers. Transfer pricing and corruption issues are not tackled by the EU-US agreement but could be 
the next areas for control. The US takes legal action against its citizens who hribe foreign nationals. 
for example. 
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6.4. Trade and Social Issues 
6.4.1. Competition policy offers one route towards bringing social values into trade policy; 
negotiations on social standards another and complementary one. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) lays down minimum standards in its conventions to be applied worldwide; respect 
for basic human rights, prohibition of child and forced labour, basic rules on safety at work and 
health protection, freedom of workers to organize themselves and conclude collective wage 
agreements. The minimum standards recognize that wage levels vary depending on what levels of 
development permit. 
6.4.2. The EU and the US share a strong commitment to human rights. Yet important parts 
of the ILO Conventions have not been ratified by either the US or by particular Member States. 
Discussions in the OECD, even before negotiations in the WTO, could be helpful here. The 
Ministerial Meeting of the OECD has in May 1995 mandated the organization to maintain its studies 
in this issue. The EU and US should give high priority to this work, which will lead to an extensive 
report in 1996. The US would like to see a WTO committee on labour standards and trade, to mirror 
that on Environment and Trade. The Deputy Under-Secretary of Labour has argued that trade 
sanctions should be available as a last resort if core standards on child and slave labour were violated. 
6.4.3. The Committee has previously expressed its opinion that the working programme of 
the World Trade Organization should include a "social clause". This should be based on Conventions 
adopted by the ILO - to which virtually all the world's countries belong - and particularly to those 
concerning: 
abolition of forced labour (Conventions 29 and 105); 
the right to organize and collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98); 
minimum age for work and the abolition of child labour (Convention 138); 
ban on discrimination in the workplace and equal pay as between men and women for equal 
work (Conventions 100 and 111). 
The question still to be debated is whether the ILO or the WTO should take the lead 
on this issue. The US believes that the issue can be pursued in both arenas. 
6.4.4. The US and EU have hesitated to make trade conditional upon social standards but 
increasingly in the 1990s basic human rights requirements are being tied to overseas aid. For 
example, the US government expressed disapproval of alleged human rights abuses in Kashmir by 
cutting $24 million from a $1.4 billion aid package to India. Penalizing, for example, non-democratic 
governments has had mixed results and France, Canada and the US have all decided to downscale 
punitive action. Rewarding "good" governments with extra aid has been more successful, though not 
problem-free. The German government has recently increased aid to countries that have complied with 
"good government" criteria and cut funding for others. Other donors have taken a more pragmatic 
approach. GSP preferences are also geared to sometimes vague definitions of fundamental workers 
rights. Donors need to coordinate their actions and seek to develop clearer and more consistent policy . 
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6.4.5. Dn clllping l'.,1u1m1cs need lll he re:1s~ured that the El and l S arc J1()l seeking 
minimum wage levels or trying to protect jobs at home. Even if some ot the poorer Asian countries, 
for example, raised wage levels ten times, the EU and US workforces would still be far more 
expensive. The declared US aim is to set a floor to competition between developing countries so that 
those with low standards cannot undercut the others. 
6.5. Consumer Protection 
6.5 .1. The demand side of the economy is just beginning to be recognized in trade 
negotiations. Under the NAFTA, the Committee on Standards related measures is looking at a 
possible tripartite working group to examine "methods by which consumer protection, including 
matters relating to consumer redress, can be facilitated". The EU is working intensively on cross-
border redress within the Union, recognizing that consumer concern over redress when cross-border 
purchases go wrong undermines the Single Market. The US is comfortable with the notion of cross-
border redress and might well be interested to pursue it in discussions with the EU, since foreign 
customers are already entitled to the same redress under US law as US citizens - enforceable by the 
Federal Trade Commission. Consumer applications for redress are dealt with on the basis of the 
location of the seller. 
7. Some conclusions 
7. 1. An expanded dialogue 
7 .1.1. In the changed environment post Cold War, the EU and US need to develop 
mechanisms for an extended dialogue on commercial, environmental and social issues. This should 
include both governmental and non-governmental contacts. For economic and social interests, and in 
the light of support received for the idea in the US, the Committee might consider a two yearly 
exchange of views on trade and development, commercial, social, environmental and consumer issues. 
7.1.2. On the agenda could be: 
comparative experience of job creation, social issues and trade, vocational training. health. 
including antidrugs programmes. unemployment and other social care systems; 
progress on regulatory policy competition policy and model business principles; 
international issues such as relations with Japan and other countries with a significant role in 
world trade, promoting sustainable development and aid/food aid to the developing countries, 
the position of Africa, commitment to multilateralism, the contribution of economic policies 
to conflict prevention, international environmental agreements; 
problems of economic and monetary policy; 
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ditfrrrnet:'s in :1c:ricultural pl1licies. mutual reducti1,ns 111 expnrt suhsidies. ,igriculture's 
cuntrihut1,1n tu the pr11tecwm of the envirnnment; 
environmental policy in the various sectors, lifestyle changes, information to consumers; 
innovative initiatives among NGOs, including civic, charity and voluntary organizations; 
cooperation in consumer issues such as cross-border redress, high health and hygiene 
standards, prudential control and maintenance of services in rural areas. 
Officials could expand discussion on these issues too and on: 
Overseas Aid: 
Environment: 
Competition policy: 
The US and EU should work together with Japan on a major new 
initiative to increase sustainable development aid to the poorer 
developing countries. 
The EU and US should deepen both their efforts to control pollution 
at home and their commitment to international environmental 
agreements. The WTO's trade policy review mechanism should 
include an environmental overview of trade policies. Mechanisms for 
controlling the export of banned and dangerous goods could be 
discussed. 
Common action on competition should prevent restrictive practices, 
transfer pricing and abuse of dominant position. 
7.2. Towards a policy of pro-active multilateralism 
7 .2.1. The EU must maintain its policy of support for a genuine multilateral system, but do 
so in a more proactive manner. A strong EU is needed if the transatlantic partnership is to expand, 
this means that the EU must also have a coherent common commercial policy. This policy should seek 
to: 
* 
* 
7.2.2. 
ensure the effective implementation, by all Contracting Parties, of the WTO agreements and 
procedures; 
be pro-active in proposing the agenda for multilateral negotiations in the decade ahead. 
In order to help promote this approach the Economic and Social Committee 
recommends that the Commission report on the II multilateral agenda for the 21 st Century 11 • This 
report would then be adopted by the Council and discussed with all the EU's trading partners, 
including developing countries. It would require leadership and thus a need to promote the wider 
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interests of the El ;u1J tl,L 111ull1!,1tl.'1,tl ,1~tl·111 rJtill.'1 L,lll ,kk1,J till' 1rncrcsb ,ii 111J1, idual grnups 
within the EU. 
The impact of new regional initiatives 
7.2.3. There is also a need to discuss the impact of regional agreements on the multilateral 
system. The growth of regional agreements, including a significant shift on the part of the United 
States towards regional approaches to commercial relations, necessitates such an evaluation. Studies 
have been undertaken by the GA TT and OECD on the impact of regional initiatives on trade and 
investment but these have not considered the wider effects of the US and other parties pursuing active 
regional approaches2. The Committee therefore recommends further consideration of the impact of 
the growth of regional trade and integration agreements on the multilateral trading system. 
8. Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement 
8.1. The idea of a transatlantic free trade arrangement has recently been raised. The 
Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, recently suggested considering a general trade liberalization 
agreement between the NAFTA and the EU. A recent speech by Mr Jeffrey Garten. L15 Under 
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, also suggested this option. The l!S-EU link is one 
of the few which is not considering the establishment of a formal regional agreement. This suggestion 
requires careful consideration, since failure to conclude an agreement would undermine rather than 
consolidate the Atlantic Partnership and highlight differences rather than commonalities. A small but 
growing number have supported Mr Garten's idea, including Lane Ki, kland. President of the US 
labour unions, and Clayton Yeutter, former US Trade Representative and Agriculture Secretary. In 
June, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the US will make a serious analysis of the 
issue. 
8.2. The advantages of a transatlantic free trade area would be that it would provide an 
important political symbol of the continued commitment of both Atlantic partners. At a time when 
both the US and EU are seeking to redefine ur define their roles in the world. such an agreement 
would help consolidate existing strengths. 
8.3. The extensive economic interdependence that exists would als11 he underpinned by a 
formal agreement. Full market access could he facilitated in areas such as investment and negotiations 
are to take place in the OECD as described in point 6.4.2. Problems on the industrial trade front are 
not too great, since tariff peaks are already declining in importance. Differences over regulatory 
policy could be resolved with a will and appropriate reciprocity. 
8.4. The "substantially all trade" conditions in Article XXlV of the GATT might prove 
an obstacle although the European Economic Area Agreement excluded most agricultural products. 
2 See also Committee's Opinion on Regional Structure of International Trade. (Rapporteur: \trs C\SSJ:\,\) Official Journal 
C 393 of 31 December 1994. 
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prohlems hut in a tree market its share would rapidly increase. Further, the LS would he unlikely 
to want to negotiate an agreement that excluded agriculture, There remain questions about such a 
strategy. 
8.5. Could a free trade agreement be concluded which excluded agriculture? There are 
precedents for this, such as the European Economic Area Agreement Although there are issues here 
concerning compatibility with WTO provisions on free trade agreements. Is there a willingness in the 
EU and US to negotiate what might amount to a "Super Blair House" agreement? Could such a 
bilateral agreement include free trade in audio-visual products, given the fundamental differences that 
exist between the US and EU in that sector? Could a bilateral agreement include provisions for 
investment or services which would add to what was negotiated in the GA TS or is currently being 
negotiated in the OECD on investment'? AnJ one might argue that a bilateral negotiation on 
agriculture would have less chance of success than a broader multilateral negotiation, which included 
a wider spectrum of interests. 
Regulatory cooperation as a first step 
• 8,6, Given the risks involved in entering into a bilateral negotiation on a treaty with the 
US, the Committee therefore recommends a more pragmatic approach at first which would help to 
focus on common interests. This approach would concentrate on regulatory cooperation. It is in the 
area of regulatory policy, broadly defined, in which most commercial disputes are likely to occur. 
This is illustrated by the cases of financial services at the end of the 1980s and the audio-visual case 
today. Future differences are also possible in the areas of environmental policy and social provision. 
In order to address these future bilateral commercial policy disputes, it is therefore necessary to 
identify the regulatory policy differences and find ways of accommodating or eliminating them. In 
this context, the launch of a transatlantic business dialogue is a step in the right direction. The hope 
would be that by the time this process had been concluded, the CAP will have been further reformed 
to accommodate accession of the Eastern European countries. Such a bilateral approach would also 
help to ensure that the respective regional approaches developed by the EU and US can be 
accommodated within a wider multilateral system of rules. 
8,7, The Committee therefore considers that studies could usefully be undertaken of the 
major regulatory differences that exist in the EU and US, in order to identify potential difficulties and 
learn from each other's experience. These studies could form the first stage of a process 11f regulatmy 
cooperation between the US and EU, based in the first instance, on cases in which there has already 
been some cooperation (technical regulations/mutual recognition, environment, competition policy. 
information technology, labour market etc.), 
8.8. Such regulatory cooperation should be inclusive, in other words it must consult the 
interests affected by regulatory policies. Consultation should involve not only commercial interests 
but also consumers, trade unions and NGOs. This would have the added benefit of contributing to 
the deepening of the transatlantic dialogue, which should also be developed on overseas aid, the 
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meetings between the EurnpL::lll l'arliament and C1mgres:,. The Committee could contribute to EU-US 
relations by meeting the economic and social interests of the US on a regular basis also, building on 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue. A future Committee Opinion on EU-US relations should consider 
how this might be set up. 
8.9. Foreign policy and security analysts no longer dominate the debate between the EU 
and US; the experience of the recent years is that the bilateral relationship is now affected by a wider 
number of constituencies. Unless these are engaged in the dialogue, disputes over regulatory policy 
differences, such as BST, the audio-visual sector, telecommunications, green house gases etc. will 
continue to undermine efforts to develop the genuine transatlantic partnership needed if the US and 
EU are to play an effective role in the world economy and international security. 
Brussels, 6 July 1995. 
The President 
of the Section for 
External Relations, Trade 
and Development Policy 
Roger BRIESCH 
The Secretary General 
The Rapporteur 
of the Section for 
External Relations, Trade 
and Development Policy 
Ann DAVISON 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Simon-Pierre NOTHOMB 
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Table I 
BASIC STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Area (1,000 sq. km) 
(EU 15 
Population, 1993 (millions) 
(EU 15 
9,373 
3,234) 
258 
369.4) 
27.6 Number of inhabitants per sq. km 
Population, annual net natural increase 
( average 1986-91) l , 854,600 
Annual net increase, 
per cent ( 1986-91) 
Gr Jss domestic product in 1993 
(billions of US $) 
(EU 15 
GDP per head in 1993 
Gross fixed capital formation: 
Per cent of GDP in 1993 
Per head in 1993 (US$) 
1.00 
6,343.3 
6,667.4) 
24,559 
13.7 
3,355.3 
THE LAND 
Population of major cities, including their 
metropolitan areas, 1991: 
New York 
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside 
Chicago-Gary-Lake Country 
THE PEOPLE 
19,384,000 
14,818,000 
8,339,000 
Civilian labour force, 1993 128,035 ,OOO 
of which: 
Employed in agriculture 3,074,000 
Unemployed 8,726,667 
Net immigration (annual average 1986-91) 730,400 
PRODUCTION 
Origin of national income in 1993 
(per cent of national income): 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Manufacturing 
Construction and mining 
Government and government enterprises 
Other 
1.8 
17 .7 
5.0 
14.8 
60.7 
THE GOVERNMENT 
Government purchases of goods and 
services 1993 (per cent of GDP) 18. l 
Revenue of federal, state and local 
governments, 1993 (per cent of GDP) 31. 1 
Federal government debt held by the public 
(per cent of GDP), FY 1993 51.6 
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Composition of the 104th Congress 1994: 
House of 
Representatives 
Democrats 204 
Republicans 230 
Independents 1 
Vacancies -
-
Total 435 
Senate 
47 
53 
-
-
100 
.. ./ ... 
Administration: 
Congress 
United States 
EU - 12 
Sources: 
United States 
EU - 12 
Sources: 
I\. I Y I I ( ; l I{ I \ i \ 11 ! I I \ l I: R \. \ I l' l \ \ L k i I \ l I U \ \ FIE L l) 
Secretary of State 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs 
United States Trade Representative 
Warren Christopher, 
Richard Holbrooke, 
Mickey Kantor, 
Peter F. Allgeier Assistant US Trade Representative for Europe and the Mediterranean 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations 
Table 2 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
(percentage of civilian labour force) 
1990 1991 1992 
5.5 6.6 7.4 
8.3 8.8 10.1 
OECD: Main economic indicators. 
Table 3 
CONSUMER PRICES 
(percentage change from previous years) 
1990 1991 1992 
6.1 3.1 2.9 
5.7 4.8 3.7 
OECD, Main Economic Indicators - Eurostat 
1993 
6.7 
10.5 
1993 
2.6 
3.3 
1994 
6.0 
11.4 
1994 
2.7 
3.1 
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Table 4 
THE ll\lPORTANCE OF TRANSATLANTIC TRADE IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Imports Exports Balance 
Bio ecu 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 
EU trade with US 86.8 86.3 73.8 84. l -13.0 -2.2 
EU trade with 51.5 47.6 20.5 22.6 -31.0 -25.0 
Japan 
EU total 487.7 486.0 435.7 482.6 -52.0 -3.4 
US trade with 75.2 92.0 36.2 40. l -39.0 -51.8 
Japan** 
US total** 413.9 505. l 340.3 391.2 -73.7 -113.9 
Japan total 179.5 205.5 261.6 308.2 82.1 102.7 
World total 2178.7 n/a 2107.4 n/a 
Source: Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
** Source: Survey of current business 
us 
share of EU 17 
exports 
share of US -
exports 
share of EU 18 
imports 
share of US -
imports 
Table 5 
THE EU's AND US' PRINCIPAL 
TRADING PARTNERS 
EU Japan Mexico EFTA 
Canada 
- 5 3 22 
21 10 30 3 
- 10 2 23 
17 18 26 3 
China others 
2 51 
2 34 
4 43 
5 31 
Source: Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
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United Kingdom 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
Italy 
BLEU 
Spain 
Others 
I 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
BLEU 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Others 
EU TRADE WITH THE US 
BY Member States 
1993 
EU imports from the US 
EU exports to the US 
I 
24 % 
21 % 
19 % 
11 % 
8 % 
6% 
5 % 
6% 
I 
28 % 
24 % 
14 % 
13 % 
6% 
6% 
3 % 
6% 
Source: Eurostar (statistics prepared hy Eurnstat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
- 5 -
Table 7 
TRADE \\TI'! I n lE LS 
TOP TEN PRODUCTS 1:VIPORTS/EXPORTS 
1993 
level annual 
variation 
PRODUCTS Bio % Extra-EU 
ecu trade by 
products** 
EU's top 10 imports from the US 
Office machinery and computers 9.85 5.2 36.8 
Miscellaneous manuf. goods 7.89 57.7 29.6 
Electrical machinery 6.69 20.7 24.1 
Other transport equipment 6.39 -25.1 43.0 
Power generating systems 5.96 4.1 43.9 
Precision instruments 4.94 2.1 48.4 
General ind. machinery 3.69 1.0 27.6 
Organic chemicals 2.43 -7.6 28.7 
Machinery for special ind. 2.37 5.9 25.1 
Road vehicles 2.30 2.2 9.9 
EU's top 10 exports to the US 
Road vehicles 7.97 54.8 18.9 
Power generating machinery 5.67 -9.5 33.1 
Machinery for special ind. 5.36 23.6 17.3 
Electrical machinery 4.76 27.1 15.9 
Other transport equip. 4.69 -3.7 20.6 
Miscellaneous manuf. goods 4.67 10.9 21.1 
General ind. machinery 4.23 16.5 14.0 
Office machinery and computers 3.73 13.0 29.5 
Petroleum, petroleum products 3.55 27.1 25.5 
Non metallic min. manuf. 3.42 18.7 20.2 
share in 
Trade with the 
United States 
% % 
cumulated 
11.4 11.4 
9.2 20.6 
7.8 28.4 
7.4 35.3 
6.9 42.7 
5.7 48.4 
4.3 52.7 
2.8 55.5 
2.8 58.3 
2.7 61.0 
9.5 9.5 
6.8 16.2 
6.4 22.6 
5.7 28.3 
5.6 33.8 
5.6 39.4 
5.0 44.4 
4.4 48.9 
4.2 53.1 
4.1 57.2 
Source: Eurostat (statistics prepared by Eurostat for the Progress Report on EU-US Relations of December 
1994, European Commission) 
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I Values in 1,000 ECU I 
EU 
List of Products Value 
0 - Food 33,182,212 
1 - Beverages and tobacco 3,386,869 
2 - Crude materials 29,901,832 
3 - Energy 63,555,941 
4 - Oils 1,759,758 
5 - Chemicals 34,086,341 
6 - Manufactured goods 70,408,647 
7 - Transport equipment 150,281,367 
8 - Misc. manuf. articles 81,205,781 
9 - Others 17,020,161 
TOTAL 484,788,909 
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Table 8 
COMPARISONS OF STRUCTURE OF 
TRADE EU AND US 
1993 
IMPORTS I 
United States 
% Value % 
6.8 21,350,836 4.1 
0.7 4,999,630 1.0 
6.2 14,282,202 2.8 
13.1 50,590,029 9.8 
0.4 916,397 0.2 
7.0 26,046,838 5. I 
14.5 59,372,163 11.5 
31.0 226,024,462 44.0 
16.8 93,436,847 18.1 
3.5 17,255,712 3.4 
100.0 515,075,116 100.0 
",,4..i:~ 
EXPORTS I 
EU United States 
Value % Value % 
27,073,626 5.6 28,868,461 7.3 
9,360,530 1.9 5,633,440 1.4 
9,034,901 1.9 21,038,480 5.3 
15,553,050 3.2 8,382,103 2.1 
1,357,431 0.3 1,297,994 0.3 
63,518,188 13.0 39,126,210 9.9 
,-,; 
80,017,668 16.4 33,442,312 8.4 ii 
207,580,432 42.6 192,039,172 48.4 11 ,, l' 
64,197,476 13.2 46,435,523 11.7 
9,156,257 1.9 20,625,077 5.2 
486,849,559 100.0 396,888,775 100.0 
-. 
.. 
- 7 -
T1h!.· () 
Table: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE US 
Stnck, valued at historical cost (book value) basis 
Year Total ($bn) EU ($bn) EU as % of Total 
1987 263.4 165.4 
1988 314.8 193.9 
1989 368.9 212.4 
1990 394.9 220.9 
1991 418.8 224.1 
1992 425.6 220.6 
1993 445.3 238.0 
Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1994 
Table 10 
Table: US FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
Stock, valued at historical cost (book value) basis 
Year Total ($bn) EU ($bn) EU as % of Total 
1987 314.3 124.0 40 
1988 335.9 131.1 39 
1989 381.8 161.0 42 
1990 430.5 180.5 42 
1991 467.8 199.4 43 
1992 499.0 207.2 42 
1993 548.6 224.6 41 
Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1994 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN THE US 
at Year-end 1993, in millions of dollars 
All Petroleum Manu- Wholesale Banking Finance 
Industries facturing trade + 
Insurance 
World 445,268 32,647 166,698 69,720 31,026 65,696 
EU-12 237,647 24,226 104,252 25,932 12,619 32,002 
Belgium 4,589 d 1,879 983 d -153 
Denmark 833 5 513 d 241 d 
France 28,470 60 16,937 1,880 2,004 2,153 
Germany 34,667 d 17,852 7,304 1,972 4.542 
Ireland 2,593 d 407 d d 443 
Italy 1.229 127 439 507 542 -477 
Luxembourg 990 d 823 d -5 113 
Netherlands 68,477 12,424 22,856 7,713 3,537 9,707 
Spain 623 d 4 162 I, 181 191 
United 95,415 9,367 42,543 6,934 2,123 16,919 
Kingdom 
EFTA 32.807 753 18,338 2.061 2.105 6,540 
Japan 96,213 254 17.746 34.754 9,803 11.837 
Canada 39,408 1,991 16.600 1,839 2.289 7.684 
Source: Department of Commerce, Survey nf Current Business. June 1994 
Note: *less than $500,000; d = suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies 
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Real Other 
Estate industrie 
s 
28,609 50,872 
10,433 28,495 
61 9 
0 d 
47 5,389 
1,074 d 
128 d 
d -116 
107 -250 
4.487 7,752 
d 20 
4,422 13.106 
417 2,594 
9,460 12,359 
4.691 4.314 
.. .I ... 
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US DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD 
at Year-end 1993, in millions of dollars 
All Petroleum Manu- Wholesale Banking 
Industries facturing trade 
World 548,644 62,409 199,457 57,645 26,720 
EU-12 224,587 19,827 91,034 21,362 8,719 
Belgium 11,552 249 5,557 2,056 97 
Denmark 1,797 d 206 572 d 
France 23,565 973 13,257 4,733 364 
Germany 37,524 2,468 22,283 2,945 2,229 
Greece 424 d 125 60 d 
Ireland 9,575 d 5,122 159 d 
Italy 13,920 352 8,745 2,086 182 
Luxembourg 2,314 30 1,289 1 187 
Netherlands 19,887 1,055 7,775 3,090 131 
Portugal 1,162 d 340 266 195 
Spain 6,437 140 3,481 984 1,090 
United 96,430 13,802 22.855 4,408 4,122 
Kingdom 
EFTA 44,569 4,376 5.718 10.832 2,653 
Japan 31,393 5,429 13.610 5.859 309 
Canada 70,395 8.840 34.062 6.653 823 
Source: Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, June 1994 
Note: d = suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies 
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Finance 
+ 
Insurance 
155,597 
66,517 
2,794 
363 
2,374 
5,107 
34 
3,389 
1,816 
753 
5,199 
127 
160 
44,401 
18,594 
4.780 
12.242 
Services Other 
industries 
18,104 28,713 
10,803 6,326 
708 91 
113 20 
996 868 
862 1,630 
d 0 
684 52 
513 227 
d d 
1,845 791 
145 d 
405 176 
4,447 2.396 
1,348 1,047 I 
I 
740 666 :; 
2,425 5.349 I 
